# UNITED STATES OF AMERICA U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

## REGULATORY INFORMATION CONFERENCE (RIC) SPECIAL PLENARY SESSION

MARCH 13, 2013

10:30 A.M.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

**Public Meeting** 

#### **APPEARANCES**

Moderator:

Eric Leeds
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Panelists:

Michael Johnson Deputy Executive Director for Reactor and Preparedness Programs, Office of the Executive Director for Operations U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Tony Pietrangelo Senior Vice President and Chief Nuclear Officer Nuclear Energy Institute

Dennis Koehl President, CEO, and Chief Nuclear Officer STP Nuclear Operating Company

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[laughter]

ERIC LEEDS: Thank you all for returning so promptly. I'm
assuming that this microphone is on; I think I can hear the echo. Yes, definitely,
definitely. Please, if you can take your seats. Again, my name is Eric Leeds; I'm
the director of the Office for Nuclear Reactor Regulation. And this is the
director's session, so this is my session, and I need to thank the participants, the
panel here. I'm going to act as a moderator. This is your opportunity to have
your questions answered by our distinguished guests today. And if I can
introduce them, I have Michael Johnson, he's the NRC deputy executive director
for Reactor and Preparedness Programs; Tony Pietrangelo, who's the senior vice
president and chief nuclear officer for the Nuclear Energy Institute; and Dennis
Koehl, who's the president and CEO and chief nuclear officer for the STP
Nuclear Operating Company.
To give you all some time to get your questions written and get
them up here to the front so that I can read them ,we have a couple I have a
couple questions to begin the conversation and get the juices flowing and get the
conversation started. So, if you'd all bear with me, the first question. It's been
almost two years since Fukushima, what has the industry and the NRC done to
make U.S. nuclear power plants safer? And since this is the NRC's conference,
we'll allow our guests to go first. Dennis, if you'd like to take that.
DENNIS KOEHL: Sure, I'll take that, but I'm going to follow
Commissioner Apostolakis' lead a lot.

With that said, we were actually very well positioned, you know, prior to Fukushima from the standpoint of the events of 9/11. We did a lot of work from the standpoint of -- that fell out from Bravo Five Bravo, getting temporary portable-type equipment on the site. So as the events of Fukushima unraveled, we didn't leverage a lot of the things that we already had in process from the standpoint of the temporary equipment. We evaluated our flexible approach to using flexible, diverse, portable equipment. The industry quickly surveyed all the utilities that were here in the United States to find out what equipment actually each site had available to them on site. We put together an inventory of that equipment that's maintained through providing information to the Institute of Nuclear Power Operation, but each of the sites actually has a list of that equipment. We definitely responded to the orders and the request for information. The industry has submitted our flex response, as well as submitted our response on spent fuel pool instrumentation. We put in place regional response centers where we'll have two regional response centers in the United States for some of the more, larger equipment, those being located in Memphis, as well as in Phoenix, Arizona. INPO has upgraded their emergency response center. We've actually had an opportunity to utilize that, even though it was unfortunate that Sandy came through on the East Coast. We did implement and INPO did man. As a matter of fact, we actually even started to proceed to send some equipment. We were actually packaging equipment up, a small portable diesel at Susquehanna and making it ready to be shipped and delivered to one of the units in New Jersey, but then they found one that was closer so we didn't have to deploy that.

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1	We've done a lot of work identifying the larger equipment that we
2	need and each of the sites has actually purchased a lot of portable, flexible
3	equipment. We're deploying a strategy such that all of the connections for the
4	equipment that we're going to have in the regional response centers are going to
5	be like for like, so when the equipment arrives at the station it'll be established
6	such that it'll be plug and play right there. It'll come with the instructions on how
7	to operate it. We're keeping the instructions to as simple as we can. I think one
8	of the other advantages that the U.S. has is because of our training programs
9	and then being accredited through the Institute of Nuclear Power Operation, we
10	have the flexibility to leverage employees from just about any utility here in the
11	U.S. and deliver them to whatever the needed site is, and then basically, what
12	they need is somebody to show them where the connection is or where the
13	equipment is and then they're capable of going there, and knowing that they've
14	been through our training program, they will have all the skills. We also have all
15	the security credentials that would go with it that would allow us to get those
16	employees there.
17	ERIC LEEDS: Thank you, Dennis. Tony, is there anything you'd
18	like to add?
19	TONY PIETRANGELO: No, I think Dennis covered it adequately.
20	ERIC LEEDS: So, Mike, from the NRC's standpoint, what's the
21	NRC done to make U.S. nuclear power plants safer?
22	MICHAEL JOHNSON: Thanks, Eric. And I want to build off of what
23	Dennis has talked about in terms of the tremendous progress I think that we have
24	made both the NRC and the industry in terms of moving forward with lessons

learned, taking real actions, and making real improvements in the plants as a

result of the lessons learned from Fukushima. Certainly, starting with the issuance of the orders and the request for information and the hard work that really preceded that and to coming to that point, we've worked with external stakeholders, key stakeholders in the industry in terms of putting together guidance needed to be able to implement those orders. And as Dennis described, certainly, with respect to the mitigating strategies orders, but with respect to the other orders, we've -- with that guidance that had plants come back, with innovative plans that had been just received, and we'll review those plans going forward, something that has been a real action.

Of course, with respect to the requests for information and the initial activity, with respect to the seismic and the flooding walk downs, again, that's an area that I would point to as where both the NRC, but also the industry has made tremendous progress. There's walk down, that guidance got finalized on time. Licensees conducted walk downs, submitted those walk down reports on time. We, the NRC, with resident inspectors, with headquarters, our folks have taken a look at those walk downs. We verified, did independent verification of the results of the walk downs, witnessed the walk downs, and we've witnessed actually results of those walk downs being captured. In our [unintelligible] reports were captured by licensees in terms of being in and under corrective actions, and I've actually been to plants and I've seen corrective actions having been implemented as a result of the walk downs.

Most of the findings, as a result of the walk downs, were not of high-safety significance. They were, I would say, of fairly low-safety significance finding, but they're important nonetheless because that provided our ability to make sure that licensees were looking at the current licensing basis with respect

to being able to respond to a flooding or a seismic situation at the plant. And so that, again, is a tremendous amount of progress. We're getting ready for the next stage, working on the reanalysis that has to happen as a result -- in the area of seismic and flooding; again, some hard work again on the part of the agency working with the industry, working with other stakeholders in terms of pulling together that guidance. That activity is important of course. One of the things that we were able to do very recently, Eric sent out a letter to the industry, to licensees, that provided really a clear expectation about where -- what should happen in the instance where a reanalyze hazard comes back and it provides for, for example, the level of flooding that's beyond the current licensing basis. But what space are we in with respect to regulatory space? What action should licensees be taking? What actions should the NRC take? That letter captured that guidance. I think that is a significant milestone; it enables us to be aligned internally, it enables the industry to be aligned. So, again, just pointing to another area, I think where we've made tremendous progress.

I guess the last point I'll make is -- so, finishing the theme of tremendous progress in the last few years, one of the things I want to point out though is that we've still got significant work ahead of us. But we've got significant work ahead of us, the reanalysis analyses will happen, we'll finish up the requests for information with respect to the emergency preparedness area, staffing, communications, we'll move forward on that. We've got to move forward in terms of looking at the integrative plans that were submitted. Our plan is to write safety evaluations by the end of November of this year, and so there's a lot of work on the part of the staff in terms of looking at what then is in those integrated plans, and of course, licensees have continued -- will continue to

- 1 implement those plans moving forward. So, there's a lot -- excuse me -- more
- 2 heavy lifting to go, but again, I think we've made considerable progress in the last
- 3 two years.

- 4 ERIC LEEDS: Terrific.
- DENNIS KOEHL: Eric, if I could follow up on one item that Mike
  talked about, and that's the standpoint of the walk downs. One of the items the
  industry has done is it that we've identified potential vulnerabilities in these walk
  downs. We have put in place comp measures in order to allow us the time to
  make sure that the safety function is adequately protected while we make the
  needed design changes moving forward at the facility.
  - MICHAEL JOHNSON: And Eric, if I can also have one other second on the reanalysis. Thanks, Dennis. I'm building on Dennis' point. You know one of the important things also with the reanalysis is that plants, when they conduct that reanalysis, should they find the -- talk about the situation which, for example, a plant could find that using current-day-methods, the analysis, the hazardous is higher than the current licensing basis. Licensees are identifying, will be identifying compensatory actions, interim plans, if you will, that they would be taking in those instances. And I think that all goes towards enabling us to have adequate assurance that as we move forward, that the plants are protected as we reset, in some cases, what the current licensing basis will be. So, again, just I think, a good amount of progress to date, certainly more work ahead of us in that area.
  - ERIC LEEDS: Okay. Thank you both, thank you both for those insights. I liked focusing on Fukushima first, what are we doing now. The second question moves away from that. It's an issue that I haven't heard anyone

1 raise yet during this RIC, but it's something that looms ahead for us. And	l ſ	yet auring this R	(IC, DUT IT?	s sometning i	that looms	anead for us.	And the
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- 2 question is what are the industry and the NRC doing to prepare for a second-
- 3 term license renewal? Look out a little bit further. Tony, I'm looking for you, if
- 4 you don't mind leading it.

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TONY PIETRANGELO: As a matter of fact, we just sponsored a workshop a couple of weeks ago here in D.C. that Chairman Macfarlane participated in, as well as some congressional representation, it was over two days; significant effort on the part of the Electric Power Research Institute, DoE. and your office of research. What we learned the first time around on license renewal is you have to do your due diligence on the front end, establish the technical basis for how to move forward. At least to this point, we don't see any showstoppers and don't see a need for a new rulemaking with regard to another term, but we haven't completed the research, but we're looking now for a pilot plant to start that process. We're already within about 15 or 16 years of the first 60-year license expiring. So, the time is now to get this program rolling, and given that our progress on new plants is going to be very deliberate, the importance of another term of generation is very, very important for the existing fleets, though. We're putting added emphasis on that and look forward to interacting with your shop, Eric, as we move forward.

ERIC LEEDS: Thank you, thank you. Mike, anything you'd like to add?

MIKE JOHNSON: Yeah, certainly I think from our perspective, our preparations, I think of them as sort of as a three-pronged activity, and Tony's touched on them. It really is to look at the licensing, you know, framework, to make sure that that framework is going to be okay. And so, that's where we

start. We're also, as Tony indicated, interacting with DoE, with EPRI, with the
industry, with other external stakeholders of course, to make sure that we have
the right issues identified, that's important. We've got we expect that there'll be
a study made up participated in by expert panels to make sure that we focus in
on the right issues. We want to make sure that when we get to the right point
where we're ready to take on that second renewal period, if you will, that we've
identified and provided the technical basis and the research that needs to
support that technical basis development. And so, that's all important work that
is happening. And as Tony indicated, I think, we're learning lessons from looking
at the effectiveness of current aging management programs and then we'll look
to plow that those insights as we go forward.

DENNIS KOEHL: And Eric, if I may, just the one item -- and Mike brought it up. It really is on the industry to make sure that we maintain a very good aging management process and program for our equipment. And even though ones that have actually already received and are in their 20-year extension right now, because the real issue will be how well that we've maintained that equipment and we keep the plant safe from the standpoint of ensuring all that safety-related equipment can serve its function.

ERIC LEEDS: Thank you, thank you. All right. While we're waiting for questions to come up from the audience -- that's a hint.

### [laughter]

Let me go to this next question. And I think that if there's a theme that I've heard from this year's RIC, I think this question embodies it and it has to do with the cumulative effects of regulation and just all the activities that are going on that have the regulator and the licensees just very, very engaged. So,

the question's a little bit long, but let me try to get through it. Both the NRC and
licensees are engaged in numerous diverse actions with varying impacts on
improving safety of nuclear power plants; these include plant-specific risk
reduction measures, as well as generic regulatory enhancements, such as
NFPA805 and GSI-191, as well as the post-Fukushima actions. It's not always
easy to compare the relative importance of different issues. So, how does the
NRC set its priorities of regulatory initiatives, and is there room in NRC's process
to recognize when a licensee is undertaking a voluntary safety enhancement that
provides greater safety benefit than some ongoing regulatory mandates? And
how do licensees set priorities among these different projects, and are there
ways that priorities can be better evaluated and more clearly communicated
between the licensee and the regulator in full view of the public? Mike, I'm going
to ask you to take the question first from the NRC.

MICHAEL JOHNSON: [laughs] I was afraid you were going to do that. I'm going to give an answer; I hope my answer matches the questions that you've asked. I want to -- thanks for the opportunity to talk about cumulative of effects of regulation. And I want to just spend a little bit of time on that if I can. I think it is an important topic. Of course, as a safety regulator, we focus on adequate protection on public health and safety, common defense and security of course. And we recognize that actions associated with that, as a start, have an impact on licensees on facilities. So, we recognize that as a part of our job, we have an impact on licensees.

Of course licensees must meet our regulatory requirements. In fact, we presumptively assume that the plants are adequate, that we have adequate protection in public health and safety, defense, and security based on

licensee finds that they're not in compliance with the regulations, they're well
aware of what the regulations provide, what is provided for in the license and
tech specs, what is provided, for example, through guidance that we have like

licensees' compliance with our regulatory requirements. And in fact, when a

guidance and Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-20. For example, with respect to

what they should when they find themselves in situations where they're not in

compliance with the requirements. And so, of course, again, actions must be

taken. That's another area where -- in which we impact licensees.

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Regarding, for example, new requirements, 5109, our backfitting regulation says that we will always backfit, we will always backfit licensees in the instances where we find that those actions or activities are necessary for adequate protection, all because of safety, common defense, and security. So, again, very necessarily there is certainly a cumulative effect, or there's an effect of our actions in terms of what they cause licensees to do. Now, we recognize that in accomplishing our safety mission that we need to preserve the ability for our staff for us, but also preserve the ability for licensees to focus on -- first on activities that are highest priority. We recognize that. And it's in that context that we also then recognize that it's entirely appropriate that we ought to pay attention to the cumulative effects of all of our activities on licensees to preserve their ability to focus on things that are most important first. In fact, 5109, the backfit rule for COLs justifies substantial safety enhancements, really says that the Commission will reach a determination about how actions or activities are scheduled, if you will, in light of ongoing regulatory initiatives. So, the backfit rule talks about making sure that as we go to add new requirements, that we, in fact, consider the cumulative effect of ongoing actions and activities. So, again, very

appropriate for us to have this conversation. We've made, as you've heard in
earlier heard through earlier discussions, made some progress with respect to
cumulative effects of regulation. Of course we, you know, the staff has been
working for a number of years in terms of trying to get better, in terms of in sort
of starting first with rulemaking, I think, what can we do to better manage the
effects of new rules, if you will, in terms of considering their impact on licensees.
And we've done things like, for example, making sure that we reach out that we
continue to improve our process by which we develop our regulatory analysis;
the cost information that gets submitted to support that. We continue to work to
make sure we have draft guidance ready for the issuance at the time of the
proposal, final guidance ready for issuance at the time of the final rule. We work
really hard. We're adding an interaction or meaningful interaction at the final
rule stage where we talk with the affected licensees about schedules. So, these
are things, again, very much rulemaking-centric, if you will, but that will help us
move forward, continue to make improvements with respect to the cumulative
effects of regulation.

I want to point out though that even though, again, in the paper, the decision the Commission's made supporting activities, focus, again, rulemaking - initially on rulemaking. We have continued to look beyond rulemaking and some of the other activities where -- that drive licensees. Reflecting on a letter I think, Tony, that you wrote, with respect to recognizing that it's not just rules --

TONY PIETRANGELO: Right.

MICHAEL JOHNSON: -- it's more than rules. And honestly, candidly, even with respect to Fukushima and the actions that we took, in terms of rolling those out, we considered the cumulative effects of regulation and the

way that we went after that. We considered, for example, the fact that we needed to prioritize some of those actions. First, they were immediate, should be implemented without delay. There were other actions that needed to wait; wait on the availability of research, wait because they were -- we could afford to wait on them. So, we, again -- and Fukushima considered, if you will, the cumulative effects of regulation. We -- in the way that we went after those items, we went after them, made it very clear we didn't want to displace things that were more important. So, we -- there was, if you will, not a rigorous, not a rote [spelled phonetically], but certainly, I think a fair consideration of cumulative effects of regulation and the way that we did that. So, it's an important -- it is important that we expand beyond where we are, with respect to our initial start, and to focus on regulatory -- on rulemaking.

Eric, and I'm almost finished, I know I'm going long winded on this, but I've been dying to talk about this, if that's okay.

#### [laughter]

I'm just not often long winded, so I want to just continue a little bit if I can. You know, the Commission has given us some direction, Commissioner Magwood and Apostolakis, I think, initiated an activity that has us -- that ultimately the Commission approved, but has us going back and looking at a plant-specific basis to see if there's a way to consider risk on a plant-specific basis as a way to provide and a way for the licensee to look in an integrated way the requirements that are on the plate for that licensee. We owe the Commission a paper that provides pros and cons, and the Commission will ultimately decide, but that's one way, again, to go after this. We -- harkening getting back on a point that I think Commissioner Svinicki made, this is an area where we really do

1	really are	looking for	good insight	s, good i	perspectives,	with resp	ect to how w	νe

- 2 can take the next step. Initially, we talked about a template, development of a
- 3 template. I think that that could have some promise. There's more work to do
- 4 and we'll have to get down into the details, if you will, if we're going to be able to
- 5 make, again, continued progress -- in order to make continued progress with
- 6 respect to cumulative effects of regulation, but I think it is an important task.
- 7 ERIC LEEDS: No, thank you for taking the time, Mike.
- 8 [laughter]
- 9 No, you've got to have a --
- TONY PIETRANGELO: I'm gratified to hear Michael go through
- 11 that.
- 12 [laughter]
- 13 ERIC LEEDS: Now, Tony?
- TONY PIETRANGELO: This is our number one issue right now,
- but let me just start by saying it's not just regulation. And we're just calling it
- 16 cumulative impact now, because as an industry we are perfectly capable of doing
- 17 it to ourselves. And by that I mean drawing attention and resources away from
- the sites to support the industry organizational activity. Bill Borchardt, at every
- 19 talk I've heard him give over the last couple of years, talks about the need to
- 20 focus on safety and reliability first and to not distract that. That's what cumulative
- 21 effects is all about, okay? So, we have to be mindful every time. It's a mindset,
- 22 all right? It's not just a series of activities; it's a cultural change. Everybody
- wants to do the right thing in their own individual order, there's no question about
- that. But who's minding the store and looking at the entire holistic picture of what
- a licensee has to deal with on a day-to-day basis, with respect to, not only what

1	the industry asks for through NEI, INPO, and EPRI, but what the NRC requires
2	us to do and expects us to do? So, we broaden our look at this. I can tell you at
3	NEI we've done a scrub of all our working groups, committees, and task forces to
4	make sure that we're not inadvertently drawing too many people away from the
5	site. We're trying to leverage technology better with webinars, conference calls,
6	et cetera. So, we're not taking people needlessly away from the site. We've got
7	some suggestions that we'll be providing you on areas that we think we can
8	manage better. But I think at the heart of that is a rigorous, transparent
9	prioritization process. You know, when you've got that much work on the table,
10	you've got to prioritize. I thought it was done very well with respect to
11	Fukushima. We got alignment, I think, very soon on what the tier one activities
12	had to be and that's what we're in the process of executing now. So, I think, you
13	know, we've got to deliver on the timetable there. We're very mindful of that, but
14	there's other things that really need to be parked later that aren't as important.
15	So, you know, that's a public, again, transparent process that we need to go
16	through. But again, as Bill reminds us at every talk, the first thing has to be how
17	are we affecting the sites and their safety, focus, and attention.
18	And I think, one last word, Commissioner Svinicki's been very
19	eloquent about this in terms of, there's only so many management attention units
20	to go around. It's not just all about resources. It's about how much a
21	management team can focus on in a given day. And that's true for both the
22	agency and for the folks that operate and run the site. So, I think we're getting
23	there, a long way to go, but we've made progress; we need to continue it.

ERIC LEEDS: Thank you, Tony, Dennis?

DENNIS KOEHL: Yeah, number one item. The inside, as Tony said, we are focusing on the overall cumulative effect. One of the items that we've recently done is gone out with a survey to all 26 CNOs, asking for really items we need to keep as our top priority and focus. And then what are some of the items that we can either stop doing because they've outlived their usefulness or things that we can work to change? To the T, all 26 reported that, you know, we have to maintain focus on operation and maintenance at a plant; the basic fundamentals of operation and maintenance are the utmost priority. And so from the leadership, that is where we have to keep our attention as we go forward.

But there are things that we've put into our system, specifically the Corrective Action Program. We leveraged the Corrective Action Program quite a bit. But it is not a standardized process across the board. And so we've got

Corrective Action Program. We leveraged the Corrective Action Program guite a bit. But it is not a standardized process across the board. And so we've got opportunities to potentially help that process and make it a little less cumbersome for our workforce as we go about identifying and fixing our own problems. Going over -- it was about two weeks ago, I think it was -- but it was -- WANO had brought together a group of CEOs, and Southern Company hosted it in Birmingham. But it was really to bring them in and international CEOs to discuss, you know, in light of everything that's happened at Fukushima and everything else, what's the major concern that you, as a CEO, have facing when it comes to safety culture and how we approach it. To the T, the top discussion internationally was the cumulative effect. Everything that we are doing, are we making the right-informed decisions of what items should be first? What is going to bring us the biggest return from safety, you know, and constantly looking at that list and reviewing it. Earlier today there was a discussion on, you know, Tier 2 and those activities. It is a living, breathing process. As we identify items in

1	flex and we start to see the value in flex, there's going to be things that will
2	change in Tier 2. I mean I participated on the Fukushima Steering Committee. I
3	interact with the regulator. And they are open. I realize that we took this
4	snapshot back in 2011, but as we move forward we're going to find, you know,
5	that we gain a lot of safety significance in this one area, and now this item that
6	we may have on Tier 2 or Tier 3, it's not going to return the value and it won't
7	have as high a priority as it did when the team first put it on the list.
8	MICHAEL JOHNSON: Eric, can I make one other second if I can?
9	ERIC LEEDS: Please, please.
10	MICHAEL JOHNSON: It was actually before I started talking, I
11	looked out in the audience. I saw Cathy Haney and Janet Schlueter seated
12	there, and I meant to make a note sometime you mentioned about cumulative
13	effects of regulations, that it's more than just reactors, it's more than just
14	reactors. So we started, of course, in this discussion with respect to reactors, but
15	we're looking more broadly, I think, in exchanges that we've had on developing
16	our ability to better manage, if you will, the cumulative effects. We certainly are
17	looking, not just in reactors, but in other programs. So
18	TONY PIETRANGELO: I'm surprised Janet didn't throw a rock up
19	here, but
20	[laughter]
21	ERIC LEEDS: Go ahead, Dennis.
22	DENNIS KOEHL: One other item. And I'm reflecting back on
23	Commissioner Svinicki's talk when we talk about the academic piece and the

practical piece of everything. You know, every site has the academic piece. We

have a five-year resource plan. And like Tony said, we're sometimes the worst.

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1 We add that cumulative impact. We stick items in that five-year schedule that we

2 try to get done for our businesses or whatever, goes beyond the regulatory side

of the house. It may be enhancements, may be up rates. But I think we have to

also think about it from the practical side of the house, which is to sit and say,

you know, where are the majority of our employees' focuses? And are we

making sure that in a day-to-day process that they are focused on the correct

items and we're not, you know, adding a multitude of distractors for them?

8 Because that is one item that we are held responsible for as the managers and

leaders, is to, you know, facilitate those individuals in what they're concentrating

on through the course of the day.

Yeah, I serve as the moderator for this panel, but I think you all know from past years, I'm not shy about giving my own opinions, and this is such an important issue. I really think it is a theme for this year. I agreed very, very strongly with what Tony and Dennis just said. The focus has always got to be on operational safety. And if we're adding distractors for the staffs, the operators at these plants, then we're doing the wrong thing.

It's very interesting, the questions that came up and I've gotten a great pile of them and I thank you all for your questions. There's some terrific questions here. Two of them relate to cumulative effects of regulation, and they're very -- both of them are very specific, asking for what the NRC is doing in a practical, meaningful way to address the issue. And I'm going to take a moment and I want to address that. The staff had sent a Commission paper to the Commission with some recommendations on how to handle cumulative effects of regulation with regard to rulemaking processes, as Mike had alluded to,

- 1 and I understand that the staff requirements memorandum, the Commission's
- 2 direction to the staff, just came out yesterday. So, because I've been very
- 3 focused on the RIC, obviously, I haven't had a chance to read it yet, but that's
- 4 concrete example of something that the staff is going to have to implement going
- 5 forward.

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6 Another example that I'd like to provide to you all, I know that we're 7 doing it in NRR, that -- I'll give you an example for one licensee that had five or 8 six major modifications going on at their site. My team met. We reviewed those 9 modifications and we performed a risk analysis of each one of those 10 modifications. And we sat down with the licensee in a public meeting and talked 11 about prioritizing those modifications based on the safety benefit to the site. And 12 the schedule that we had licensee implement for those modifications were 13 directly proportional to the safety benefit being gained by those modifications. 14 That's something that we can do now. And I think that's something that the NRR 15 staff will embrace, and so licensees that find that they have an awful lot on their 16 plate, you know, I encourage you to come in and talk to us about it. We're willing

No. All right. I'm getting to the questions that you all have sent up here, so thank you for that. The question reads, "With discussion of exporting U.S. small modular reactor technology, both for U.S. economic interests as well as for the U.S. nuclear fleet, do you believe that the current review schedule for SMR licensing documents can be approved to allow this furthering of the

to entertain that. We want to do the right thing for safety, and the bottom line is

operations of the -- the safe operation of those plants. So, thank you all, and let

every day these plants that are operated, the focus has got to be on the

me go on to another question, unless anybody else with another second.

technology for both domestic and international consumption?" And since it's more directed at the NRC, I'll direct it to Mike.

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MICHAEL JOHNSON: Sure. I'll start with that. First of all, from a regulatory perspective, safety regulator perspective, our interest is going to be to make sure that whatever applications we get as we work through those, that those designs that we are ultimately approve our -- meet our requirements so that they will be safe. We've looked at -- in terms of getting ready for this -- the small modular reactor applications that will come in, taking advantage of all of the lessons that we've learned through our licensing process, through our most recent activities and working through Part 52 to look at large light water reactor applications. And we're applying those, if you will, to the process that we're using -- that we use to review small modular reactor applications. A specific aspect of that has been to develop a design-specific review standard for those applications as they come in. So, we've looked at -- if you think about the standard review plan in its entirety, we've looked at that standard review plan, and we've built a design-specific review plan for the small modular reactor application. We think that that will help us be more efficient and be more focused, more safety focused, if you will, in terms of how we'll do that particular review. So, we are anticipating that we're going to be able to do the process that we implement, review those small modular reactor applications, if you will, while we are maintaining our focus on safety, ensuring that at the right -- at the back end we get the product that provides that protection for public health and safety on the defense and security and that we are efficient -- more efficient in terms of how we execute those reviews.

TONY PIETRANGELO: Let me take a shot at that one. First of all, 2 SMRs have great promise. You know, the technology has evolved. We're still 3 looking at light water reactors as well as other designs, but certainly the benefits 4 have -- of SMRs I think have gotten a lot of people's attention. The key guestion, 5 though, is can you operate and maintain them economically as -- where it's a 6 business case for the SMRs? And if part of that hinges on how some of the 7 regulatory issues are going to cut, our role with NEI's then to try to focus on the 8 generic issues associated with SMRs, control room staffing, security, for 9 example, defense in depth, given the advantages that the technology has. So, 10 the sooner we can work through those kind of generic issues, I think we can start putting some better numbers around the O&M case. And then I think that utilities 12 operating companies, both here and abroad, can make decisions on whether to 13 go forward. So, we've made a lot of progress so far, but it's a very promising 14 evolution of our industry and certainly there's going to be a role for these. If we 15 can get these down to manufacturing versus construction environment and 16 incrementally add capacity, that just has tons of advantages commercially. 17 MICHAEL JOHNSON: Yeah. I should note I spent a little bit of 18 time in a session on small modular reactors yesterday afternoon and the room 19 was packed. There was tremendous interest in that session. And we talked 20 about -- the stakeholder panelists talked about preparations that have been made looking at, for example, policy issues and getting those issues up in front of 22 the Commission, working with applicants in terms of helping them understand the 23 process. So, there's been a lot of work in terms of making sure, certainly from a

regulatory perspective, that these will be able to move forward in a manner that is

appropriate. So, again, it's an area -- we'll see what happens. I understand that

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1	the first applications are coming in next year. Certainly we've been linked up with
2	the Department of Energy in terms of the Department of Energy's 50/50
3	government/private cost share effort to sort of incentivize that. We've been
4	linked up with the Department of Energy because we want to make sure that
5	we're ready to move forward on the applications they on the projects that
6	they're supporting. So, we think we're in a good position with respect to that.
7	So, I think that the picture's rosy; of course, as with most things, there's work
8	ahead.
9	ERIC LEEDS: Thank you both, and Mike, I'm glad you mentioned -
10	- the SMRs session I understand was standing room only and also the session
11	on construction, on new construction, was standing room only, so I want to thank
12	you all for not just milling about out in the hallway and actually coming to the
13	technical sessions. Obviously they we've picked some good ones, so thank
14	you all for that.
15	All right. The last question was more aimed at the NRC, but I really
16	appreciate Tony, you adding your perspectives. This next one is more aimed at
17	the industry, although I think Mike and I could add our perspectives because I
18	think this is universal. The question reads: "Given economic realities, how can
19	the industry respond to Commissioner Magwood's challenge to improve utility in-
20	house engineering capability. What role does NEI have to play in this area?"
21	TONY PIETRANGELO: NEI? I'm not sure
22	ERIC LEEDS: That's how the question reads.
23	TONY PIETRANGELO: Right. Yeah. I'm not sure NEI can do a lot

of in-house capability for any -- our member companies, but we do try to take on generic things and leverage the entire industry technical expertise on a given

1 issue. I think that's where we add value to the process. I think Commissioner

- 2 Magwood's admonition was to not get complacent with regard to any of the
- 3 disciplines we need to operate these plants safely and reliably, both on the
- 4 regulatory side and on the commercial side. And I think it's good advice.

5 ERIC LEEDS: Dennis, anything?

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DENNIS KOEHL: Yeah. I would add, you know, when you really look at the facilities, you've got the equipment and then you have the people that operate them. We need to continue to invest in the people that operate them. I don't know about utility out there, but I can speak for mine. We face a cliff edge of retirements, and if you look at this industry through the '80s, we right-sized, I think that was the term we were using back then. And by doing that, our demographics are skewed way to the right. So, we definitely need to replace those engineers. I think we see it today when we have a new engineer that doesn't understand, you know, why something is the way it is and then we're spending time trying to back over engineering judgments, decisions that were made, you know, by a group of people that made those decisions 20 years ago. And if we don't invest, and we don't spend the time mentoring and educating our newer workforce, I think they're all going to be faced with shortcomings when those retirements start to happen. And so, to me, what I keep my focus on is to make sure that we're keeping that pipeline there. We can look for opportunities, and I know everybody has a budget, but we've got to look for opportunities where we can, you know, inject new people into the process to get them educated and brought up to speed, even if that means we start leveraging our vendors. I know there's a lot of vendors. I saw, you know, the raising of the hands when Commissioner Magwood was speaking, you know. We've got to leverage our

vendors as well to get some of those new individuals in so that they can start to

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2 be educated and potentially move into different branches of our business. 3 MICHAEL JOHNSON: I like the fact that their questions touches on 4 the area of expertise and knowledge management. So, just if I can, just expand 5 a little bit from a regulatory perspective what we are doing. Certainly, as was 6 indicated by the commissioners, we are heavily dependent on the ability of the 7 staff to be technically capable. We need engineers, we need highly skilled 8 engineers, highly experienced engineers, and we continue to work that -- do a lot 9 of training programs or knowledge management programs, for example. It's 10 currently -- about a third of the staff has been on the staff for less than six years. 11 [unintelligible] the staff, on the staff for less than six years. So, that should tell 12 you how important it is, how -- emphasize how important it is for us as an agency 13 to make sure that we are focused on having a vigorous knowledge management 14 program. Mike Webb, I don't see him in the room right now, is a deputy 15 executive director who has -- who is sponsoring our knowledge management --16 leading our knowledge management activities. Mike -- and with efforts of the 17 knowledge management steering committee, senior managers, really shepherd, 18 if you will, the activities of the agency and making sure that we both are able to 19 capture knowledge, translate that knowledge, transfer that knowledge to 20 individuals going forward. We've got tools and techniques in place to capture 21 that knowledge, make it available to the staff. We've got a knowledge 22 management center. We've got communities of practice where staff can share 23 with staff insights, again, all focused on making sure that you get folks on board, 24 technically capable folks on board, we transfer knowledge to them so we can

1 continue to meet the challenges so that we can deal with challenges as we go

2 forward. So, it's just an important, really valuable area for us to work on.

the NRC also does that I think has worked well for us in the recent past, is that we're focused on bringing two types of folks in. Certainly we focus on people with experience, people that have been out in industry or in related industries that can bring a wealth of knowledge to us. We also find it very valuable to bring people in directly from college. And we've found that we've been getting very, very high quality folks in, you know, completing their bachelors and masters and even Ph.Ds. and then putting them through our training programs and our knowledge management type programs. The enthusiasm, the mix that we get on our staff I think just makes the staff that much stronger, having the experience and the young folks coming in. I know that the industry is doing some of the same.

We move on to the next question, and this one is aimed more at the NRC, but I'm going to ask Tony and Dennis to give their perspectives as the recipients of regulation. The question is, "What can countries that are building large numbers of nuclear power plants learn from the NRC about safety and regulation in the United States?" So, Mike, I'm going to ask you to take a first crack at that.

MICHAEL JOHNSON: You didn't want to take a first crack at one, Eric? Just kidding.

ERIC LEEDS: If you'd like.

MICHAEL JOHNSON: I'm just kidding. That's an interesting -- it's interesting in the way that that question is posed because actually as I view it, we

learn -- we give as good as we get in terms of our interactions with other international regulators, recognizing that in areas like construction oversight, for example, I think it was Commissioner Magwood who talked about the hiatus in terms of construction in this country and the fact we are learning. We learn from international regulators with respect to their experiences and how they oversee those. I'm looking at John Persapnio [spelled phonetically] in the front row and thinking about the French in terms of what we've been able to learn through just those interactions, for example. So, again, we do get -- value tremendously our interactions with international stakeholders. We also, though, I think are tremendously proud of what we've been able to accomplish in terms of the way we approach regulation. We think it's tremendously important. I think Bill, in his opening, talked about the principles about regulation. We think it's tremendously important that the regulator -- that we have as principles that we live those principles, that would be independent, that would be open, transparent, that we interact with external stakeholders.

We think, actually, that there is a role for the regulator to interact with the industry in terms of the -- be independent -- but we also value that interaction. And we think, actually, in terms of approaching regulation that you end up with better regulation when you make sure that the regulated entity understands the intent of the requirement, factors in ways then to developing those requirements, and so on and so forth. So, those are things that I think that we do really well. I think this talk -- the question that we answered previously about expertise, we value -- NRC values, again, indigenous, technical expertise, also expertise on the staff. We think it's important that we not have to go outside

of our organization to get that expertise. So, I think that's something that I would point to.

And then, you know, I would -- I think -- I would point to the vigorous role of oversight in our process, the vigorous role of oversight, as it's implemented so well by our regional offices, for example, and our processes across the facilities. I think that's one of the things that is a strength -- a noteworthy strength of the way in which we, as a regulator, approach regulation in our country, so...

ERIC LEEDS: Thank you.

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TONY PIETRANGELO: I just got back from a trip to Japan a couple weeks ago, and they're going through kind of an upheaval for obvious reasons with a new regulator, a new regulatory -- proposed regulatory framework. They separated out the regulation from their advocacy just like we did in here in 1974. So, all I could do was tell them what we do here and why. And Michael's covered some of it. But on the industry side, and it took us a long time to learn this ourselves, is that it's not good enough to just complain and whine about stuff. All right? If you don't like what the regulator's doing, don't just complain, put a constructive alternative on the table. I can cite numerous examples from the ROP and even construction ROP to even some of the things on Fukushima. So, it's not enough just to say, "I don't like this." You got to get in there and -- and that's what makes a regulator strong is the ability to take view points and perspectives from all the different groups in a transparent way and make a fully informed decision going forward. And so, I think that's worked for us. We've learned our lesson the hard way sometimes. But it does work overall, and that's the promise going forward is to work through these issues. We're in

- 1 the middle of a huge implementation effort on the Fukushima items that was
- 2 added on top of the plate when cumulative impact was there before Fukushima.
- 3 So, that's what we're going through now. But we're working through it,
- 4 sometimes painfully, but we're getting there. And in the transparent, open
- 5 process where, again, we don't just complaint about things, we're trying to put a
- 6 constructive alternative on the table for some of these activities.
- 7 ERIC LEEDS: Thank you, Tony. I really appreciate that. Dennis,
- 8 did you --
- 9 DENNIS KOEHL: Yeah, I just view it as a little bit of a -- it's a
- 10 different form of operating experience. I mean, we always think operating
- 11 experience has to be from what's happening at the physical utility or at the end
- device. In here it's a different type of operating experience that's from the
- 13 regulatory side of the house. What are the lessons learned? What are some of
- 14 the things that have occurred -- I mean, we do have new construction going on
- 15 here and there are items that are going to come up through that new construction
- and we can learn from what's going on overseas as well as they can learn from
- 17 here. And one of the items that -- from INPO and WANO, we have done well is
- 18 the ability to share all that operating experience and to get it out there. But it
- does no good if we get it out there if we don't use it ourselves or take advantage
- 20 of it.
- 21 ERIC LEEDS: Thank you. Thank you all for this. Mike, you
- 22 wanted to add something else.
- 23 MICHAEL JOHNSON: I did. The other thing I should have pointed
- out -- you hear me -- the other thing I should have pointed out is I pointed to the
- role in the industry. I should also have pointed to the role of other stakeholders.

- 1 I remember as we were talking, as Tony was talking, I was remembering back on
- 2 the days before the ROP actually and the vigorous input that we had from UCS,
- 3 for example, what they'd locked on in terms of insights regarding that prior
- 4 process. And we got to a point as an agency where we found, for example,
- 5 where we were in a position with respect to our beliefs about how that oversight
- 6 process was working, and the industry and UCS and other external stakeholders
- 7 were aligned that that process needed to change. That was good insight for us.
- 8 I think one of the things that we value as a regulator that has helped
- 9 tremendously, contributed to our ability I think to move forward, has been the act
- 10 of engagement actively -- us actively engaging other external stakeholders and
- 11 including trying to bring them into our regulatory process -- provide input to our
- regulatory process as we move forward. So, I think that's another important
- 13 ingredient.

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strongly about, so I want to add my opinions to this. I agree with what all the panel has said. And I'm interpreting the question being directed very U.S.-centric. I agreed with what Mike had to say; there's things that very valuable out in the international community that you can learn from all different regulators, and we learn from all regulators. There's a number of very good international standards for how a regulator should be set up. Certainly the IEA principle is a good regulation. And I know, that the NEA, the Nuclear Energy Agency, is currently working on the green booklet on the effective habits of good regulators. It's something that's just gotten underway. But if you look at three things distinctly American that I would advise a country that's starting out on a new

nuclear program, I'm going to mention three items. Mike mentioned the one: in-

house technical expertise, I think that's just paramount. You have to be -- have
 that technical credibility to be a good regulator. It's just so important.

A second attribute that I find at the NRC that I think is very important and I'd advise any foreign country to try to adopt and it's very difficult, is you've got to instill a safety culture in your staff that values diverse opinions. You've got to allow the staff and encourage the staff to raise diverse technical opinions. It makes the process take longer. It makes it cumbersome. It can be very painful. But that's how you get to the best technical answers, by hearing all the different diverse opinions on specific technical issues.

And the third, and I think that this is very distinctly American as far as I understand the international community of regulators, that I think is very valuable, is the NRC's inspection program. I'm especially proud of the inspection program. I'm especially proud of our regions and how they implement that inspection program; and our resident inspectors, the folks that live and work every day at each one of the plants. I think when the local public understands that we're there at the plants every day, that we have our own people there watching every day, I think it provides a lot of credibility. It's also -- I don't know how to regulate without it. I think our resident inspector staff is just that valuable.

So, I'll get off my soapbox on my three, and we'll move on to another question. This question's directed at the NRC, but since Mike answered the first one -- the last one first, I'm going to direct this at our -- at NEI and the industry to answer first, Tony and Dennis. "With respect to NFPA805 -- we have about 50 plants that are in the queue for NFPA805. Can you talk to us a little bit about what might be thwarting adoption of NFPA805?" And Tony, in light of what

you said before, what can the industry do to help even out the process, make the process better, how can we get more folks through the NFPA805 process?

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TONY PIETRANGELO: My understanding is that the -- part of the dilemma here is how we're using PRA for fire. It's a new frontier in that spatial interactions associated with areas and [unintelligible] sources, et cetera. Some of the early efforts that both the industry through EPRI and the Office of Research participated in -- I forget the NUREG number, 5750, I believe it is -- I think was a good effort. But it wasn't benchmarked against anything. It wasn't piloted by anybody. And we're learning as we go with this now, but you see, and this is I think also going to be instructive when we look at, you know, seismic PRAs and other areas that when you take a lot of conservatism in a PRA, you're going to get a pretty drastic answer. So, let's say the initial applications of 5750, if you believe what came out of that, was we should have had three core melts and 50 significant fires over the first, you know, 30 years of operation. Obviously that didn't happen. So, there's some benchmarking that needs to be done and I think we're still in an area where -- the peer reviews I think have been questioned to some extent where there are still additional questions by the staff on the technical adequacy of the models being used, that is slowing progress down. Now, they may be very good questions, okay. But the whole effort that I remember was you have to put your faith in the peer review process such that that model adequacy is not the issue. It's the application you're looking at in the review is what's important. They're still hung up in model adequacy issues and that's what's slowing it down. So, I think it offers still great promise. I think we're still learning from it after the first two pilots. We need to do another lessons learned, I think, on this to make sure that we're still on track. But, again, I think

- 1 with probabilistic risk assessment, it's an area you learn with time. I just
- 2 remember from the Level 1 PRAs how long it took us to really understand what
- 3 we had in that, we had a lot of data on, and operating experience to draw on.
- 4 So, I think the same thing will happen with fire over time. It's just a slow process.
- 5 DENNIS KOEHL: I would just like the second what Tony said, is 6 we do have to keep confidence in the peer review process, but the other item,
- 7 because not every person is the perfect PRA analyst, we need to make sure that
- 8 we keep the right resources working on it and the right resources assigned to the
- 9 review, because the more we would change either -- whether it's at the utilities
- side or on the regulator side, that consistency of that review can help us get them
- 11 through the process because, you know, go on risk-informed and having that
- analysis, it takes a little bit of expertise, definitely, to fully understand all those
- pieces of it. So, I think from the regulatory side, as much as we can keep those
- reviews being done by a, you know, consistent group that has that understanding
- and then continue to leverage the peer reviews, I think we can expedite the
- 16 process.
- 17 MICHAEL JOHNSON: Well, I just -- thanks for the opportunity,
- 18 Eric. I, again, I appreciate the premise of the question and I don't have -- you
- 19 probably have better insights about how it's going. I would just say I think the
- 20 spirit of the comments that Tony and Dennis made are dead on in terms of an
- 21 NFPA805 is so important -- is important because it provides a performance-
- based risk informed approach for us to be able to do what 5048(b) provides in
- 23 terms of a deterministic approach to making sure that plants are safe in the event
- of fires. And, of course, the elegant part of 5048 is -- biggest [unintelligible] of
- 25 5048(b) didn't have the benefit of PRA, didn't have the benefit of some of the

more modern, more recent fire modeling insights that we had. And so, it is worth us making sure that whatever the impediments are, if you will, whatever we need

to address with respect to issues, that we work through those issues. And, of

course, there at the end you want to add to that based on your --

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ERIC LEEDS: This is another one I'm not going to sit back on. I think this is so important. I think NFPA 805, there are so many different safety benefits that licensees can gain from implementation of NFPA 805, that I think it's very important to address, and I agree with you 100 percent, Tony. I think we've got to take -- continue to take the learnings that we're getting from these current plants that are going through and incorporate them into our process, make the process more effective, more efficient. I know I was speaking with the licensee for Cook Plant. Cook should be finishing up their NFPA 805 in the next four or five months. We should be getting out a safety evaluation on that. And I told the licensee I want to meet with them and get constructive feedback once the process is over. We need to get that constructive feedback to the staff to see how we can improve the process going forward. I know Joe Giitter's holding monthly calls with all the site management for everyone who's got NFPA805 submittals in-house right now, providing what we're learning, what the staff is learning. I'm very sensitive to the comments on PRA and how we're using our resources on PRA and how we can be more efficient in doing that. So I think, Dennis, you make a very good, strong point there. For the members of the public that are here, I just want to emphasis NFPA805 is not a paper work exercise. The modifications that plants are making at the site is costly them millions and millions of dollars; and what I see from a regulator's standpoint is that it's improving the site, it's improving safety, getting rid of operator manual actions,

putting in these modifications are significant improvement to plant safety, and I want to keep going down this path. So, we're going to do everything we can at

the NRC to make sure that we make it an efficient process and improve it as we

4 go forward.

The next question, and I'm going to direct this more to the industry, although I'm sure Mike and I have an opinion, and I think this is an industry initiative in response to one of the orders from the NRC involving Fukushima for mitigating strategies. It involves the flex initiative that the industry is in the process of implementing. And it has to do with -- the question's very specific, but I'm going to ask the panelists to answer it on a more general basis because I think you can take this question a lot of places. The question has to do -- it very specifically asks, "Is flex equipment that's stored off-site operated on a regular basis? Can we be sure that it will be operable as intended when called upon?" And I think you can take that question and talk about equipment on-site as well as off-site and all the things that licensees are doing to implement the flex initiative.

DENNIS KOEHL: I'll start with that one. From the standpoint of the equipment, yes, it's flexible, it's diverse, it's portable; but at the same token, we are putting in place preventative maintenance programs for that equipment. Now some of that equipment is going to be preventative maintenance programs and such that, yep, it's going to be periodically run and we're going to ensure that it operates. There's other pieces of equipment that the answer may be, you know, we replace it on a set frequency because the cost of doing the maintenance, it's actually more economic to just purchase a new, you know, a new component after a set shelf life. But the intention is that all that equipment will be able to

1 deliver the function that we're asking it to do at the time and at the need. And

2 that's both on-site equipment that will be stored throughout the plant, as well as

3 the equipment that's actually going to be at the regional response center. Part of

4 our contract with the regional response center is to physically perform the

5 maintenance on that equipment and to actually, as part of our response there,

we're also going to demonstrate that we have the capability to deliver that

equipment, and once that equipment is delivered to a site it can be attached and

started and run to deliver its function.

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TONY PIETRANGELO: I'm going to take this in maybe a little different area than Dennis did. One of the questions one of the commissioners got earlier this morning was about when we did the walk downs of the B5B equipment after Fukushima, we found some deficiencies. And there wasn't any programmatic requirement associated with the B5B order for the testing and maintenance of that stuff. So that was a shortcoming, I think, on our part as well as maybe the regulator's part. But where I want to take this is recommendation one, because I think this is what the task force found primarily when they looked at efforts in the past to treat beyond design basis things, they found inconsistent treatment. And so, that wasn't an opinion. That was a fact. Okay? And going forward, I think one of the benefits we'll get out of recommendation one is we need to define what the treatment should be for beyond-design basis, and do we value regulatory stability and predictability going forward. So if we do not define what this treatment is, we'll all fall back on what we've been doing for the last 35 or 40 years. We'll treat it just like we treat all the safety-related design basis stuff. And I would argue that that's not the right safety approach for this equipment. All right? You have to be able to allot your resources and attention

commensurate with the risk significance. These are much more low probability events. We should not pay the same level of attention to these things. And we're not taking a qualification approach to the purchase of this equipment. It's the redundancy and diversity of equipment and where we stage it is where we're going to get the benefits. So, unless we'll define what this area is, I think we're always going to be in this quandary about what to apply, what kind of programmatic treatments. I trust the rulemakings going forward will have a programmatic requirement on whatever we implement per the order. We thoroughly expect that. We've already laid out some requirements for ourselves and our own guidance on how to treat this stuff. But I think that's one of the lessons learned from the early efforts after Fukushima is that this is an area where I think we can add some real benefit.

MICHAEL JOHNSON: Yeah, I think -- thanks Tony. I think the points that you made cover the territory with respect to how we ought to approach this. Certainly from a regulatory perspective, we do with respect that mitigating strategies order requiring that licensees develop, implement, and maintain capabilities for the plant to restore, maintain our ability to core-to-core containment, spent fuel pool in the event of a beyond-design basis external event. It sounds like I read this recently, doesn't it? Read it all the time. It's an important order. And that maintaining is a part of it, and we'll provide provisions to make that happen. The rulemaking and looking to do that rule will codify that, make it generically applicable going forward. Tony's point is dead on about making sure that at the end that licensees have current standards about what we think in terms of maintenance of those capabilities and that as a regulator we go back and we continually periodically at the appropriate frequency, appropriate

1	amount of effort, oversee licensees' implementation of that those requirements			
2	So, again, we've got the order in place, we've got plans, we've got a rulemaking			
3	that will come capturing those aspects and we'll build into the oversight process			
4	for implementation assurance that that capability is being maintained. I guess I'll			
5	wait and talk about recommendation one to see if there's a question on			
6	recommendation one. Otherwise I'll remain silent.			
7	TONY PIETRANGELO: Right on.			
8	[laughter]			
9	ERIC LEEDS: None here yet, huh? Not on recommendation one.			
10	TONY PIETRANGELO: It was a clue.			
11	ERIC LEEDS: Thank you all. Let me move on to another topic.			
12	This is emergency preparedness. The question reads, "In case of a nuclear-			
13	related emergency, how does the NRC regulate the complex interface between			
14	on and off-site emergency response and how does the industry manage to			
15	improve this interface?"			
16	Any volunteers?			
17	TONY PIETRANGELO: Want to go first? I think Michael should go			
18	first on this one.			
19	[laughter]			
20	MICHAEL JOHNSON: Well, I'll start with an answer and then, Eric,			
21	if you want to weigh in. So, I'm focusing on the interface. I mean, I think it's			
22	clear the responsibilities for emergency preparedness are clear in terms of the			
23	role of the NRC making an overall call with respect to the adequacy of programs			
24	and their implementation. Of course, we focus on-site, we work very closely with			
25	FEMA. FEMA understands they're responsible for making sure that off-site plans			

- 1 exist, what state and local decision-makers and their first plans can be
- 2 implemented. There's a process, well understood in terms of how that gets
- 3 exercised, how, in fact, the state and locals play in that process. And so I think
- 4 actually those interactions work very well from all indications. We've had a
- 5 number of instances -- we routinely through, for example, weather-related
- 6 events, hurricanes that we've had recently, including as recently as Hurricane --
- 7 Superstorm Sandy, however we refer to that, that gave us an opportunity, I think,
- 8 to exercise that capability, our capability, our interfaces with FEMA, our
- 9 interfaces with states and locals. And from all accounts I think that worked
- 10 particularly well.

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So I guess the bottom line is I believe these interfaces are working well. We continue to look for lessons learned. We get an after action report as a result of Superstorm Sandy to see if there were things that we could do in terms of how we approached that activity we've identified. Even though there were successes, there are areas that we can build on. So it's an area that is deserving of attention that gets our attention. I think we're making significant progress.

DENNIS KOEHL: I think from the industry's aspect of, you know, when we do run our exercises and we do participate in different drills, that that interface with the local community, state, and local officials, it can't stop just there. It's, you know, yeah it's -- we have that exercise to deal with. But from beyond that I think the more interaction we have with state and locals, what the capabilities are, making sure that they stay educated to some of the things and changes that we're making, some of the items that are coming out of Fukushima and the things that we're doing in the changes. If we don't take the time to educate them or to work with FEMA, I think the regional response centers, we

1 spend time talking here in Washington to FEMA because of transportation of that

2 equipment. We may get to a point that, yeah, we've got a private means to get it

to the place, but now we've got regulations that are in place that say they can't

4 land at this airport.

So, you know, we had to interact with FEMA to make sure that we understood what the protocol was going to be so that equipment could be accessed and made available at the different facilities. So it's a constant dialogue that needs to go on and I think with every opportunity we make improvements.

ERIC LEEDS: Yeah.

TONY PIETRANGELO: My concern on emergency preparedness is that we may be pushing too much change too fast. Prior to Fukushima, we're already implementing -- in the process of implementing a revised EP rule that is part of the Tier 1 requirements. We've got staffing and communication requirements associated with EP. And there was others -- and the rest of the tiers on -- you know, we talked [unintelligible] and dose assessment, et cetera. Hostile action based drills is another part of the interface with the security element. And now, I mean I was in a session yesterday looking at changing the 16 planning standards on EP. How much -- this is -- you want to talk cumulative impact, let's just focus on EP for a second. That's a lot of change in a short period of time that I think we've got to pay particular attention to. There has to be time to be able to hone and execute your strategies and get better at those and not push so much change that you can't, you know, do that adequately.

So I think that's an area we got to pay particular attention to. We're lucky to have very good management here at the NRC with Mark and Jim and

- 1 their openness to have a dialogue with our working group and task force. And
- 2 kudos to my own staff at NEI and Sue and company, both from Tom Joyce, our
- 3 working group chairman who has kind of shouldered the effort for us and brought
- 4 that back to the CNOs on the inside SAIC and stressed the importance of EP, the
- 5 ownership of EP, and the need to support your EP folks. But I think we need a
- 6 little help on this one and I'm assuming the state and locals do too. Their
- 7 budgets are squeezed. There's only so much change that they can handle in a
- 8 given amount of time. So this is one where I would advise, you know,
- 9 management, attention, and sensitivity to, you know, how fast we implement
- 10 change here.

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ERIC LEEDS: Thank you all. I appreciate your responses to the question. It's interesting because the question on emergency preparedness came from one of our international visitors, and I just want to reach out to the international community and the person who wrote this and make sure that they know that here in the United States we require all of our licensees to practice emergency preparedness every year. Every second year the NRC practices along with the state and local responders; so it's a constant practicing. We've been doing it since Three Mile Island. I think the rule was actually promulgated in 1980. So if you'd like more information on how the NRC and how the United States practices emergency preparedness, I urge you to come and contact us here at the NRC so that we can -- and we'll spend some time with you and explain to you what we do and why we do it. We've had a lot of learnings over the past 30 years --

TONY PIETRANGELO: Yeah.

ERIC LEEDS: and I think that we're pretty far advanced.	Not
that we don't have more learning from Fukushima.	

MICHAEL JOHNSON: Yeah, I do want to just pick up on a thought that Tony made, which I think is a good point regarding the focus of Fukushima, some of those actions that deal with EP and, you know, there's really a whole suite of recommendations related to EP, and we have been making, again, as [unintelligible], but also with full participation on the part of the industry. Progress in terms of tiering, if you will, those items; making sure that we move forward first on the items that need to be moved, that we need to move for the first time. And we've done I think, to date, a good job in terms of looking to see where are the things that we're already doing as it relates to other actions, for example. Where are there other things that we don't need to do much on because the industry's already doing something considerable on it? And we've had some successes in the EP area. And so I'll take Tony's point regarding the need to make sure that we watch this area carefully. I think we are, but it's always such an important area, of course, is one that we need to focus on -- continue to focus on going forward.

MALE SPEAKER: Well thank you. Since we've got the spotlight on the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, I think I'll keep it there with this next question.

21 [laughter]

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Please provide a perspective on progress to date with respect to cyber security initiatives and the challenges moving forward.

24 [laughter]

1	DENNIS KOEHL: Well I'll start out. You know, we've made a lot of
2	progress with the items that we had to complete last year. But I think where the
3	real challenge is going to come now is with the physical implementation and
4	making sure the devices that we have today and if, you know, if I think it was
5	Commissioner Magwood this morning, you know, he's trying to go here and can't
6	because of cyber security. I think where we're going to run into the biggest
7	challenge is as we implement the items that we put in place last year and some
8	of the programs, they're going to be slow, and we're going to find that certain
9	items we're going to have to eliminate in the future. Whether that be, you know,
10	definitely as we go into some drives and those type items that they're going to go
11	away, that we're not going to really end up being utilizing those. But at the
12	same token I think we've got to keep revisiting what's the real threat and can we
13	look for means to minimize the impact that equipment so that we don't create a
14	new larger overall impact. Because now we'll be focusing on every electronic
15	device that's out there, and that can become in itself a cumulative impact to us
16	and a distractor from the standpoint of, is it really interfacing with the equipment
17	or the plant?

MICHAEL JOHNSON: Just --

TONY PIETRANGELO: Go ahead.

MICHAEL JOHNSON: Thanks, Tony. So with respect to cyber, I just wanted to make the point that I think this is an area, like many areas, that we're actually making tremendous progress on, with respect to 7354, 2009, and that rule that provides for protection of computer and communication systems in that works from cyber threats. I think that rule was an important milestone and, in fact, I think that puts us out in front of many other sectors in terms of our

- 1 approach to cyber, this industry. That will, of course, require cyber plans,
- 2 licensee submitted cyber plans. We've reviewed those cyber plans. The
- 3 industry -- milestones, milestones one through seven. Milestone seven being
- 4 accomplished at the end of last year. The industry did a lot of heavy lifting in
- 5 getting through the implementing, if you will, those milestones, and I think that
- 6 goes a long ways towards providing that high assurance that that rule is intended
- 7 to provide that those systems' critical visual assets, refer to them, are capable to
- 8 withstand a cyber threat.

So there's been a lot of work done to date. Of course we're off now, out inspecting. We've had a number of inspections that has been conducted. Most of those inspections -- there's four inspections, the one came back clear. There are -- were some issues with the other three, but in general, I think while we would point to some issues, maybe some programmatic areas in those inspections where we, again, need to do additional work in making sure all of the expectations are clear, in general I think our perspective is that we've made tremendous progress and we're on the right track.

We are reliant on -- have put in place -- are using the security frequently asked questions process as a way to be able to make sure that we flesh out -- raise up and flesh out, if you will, issues where there are differences, lack of understanding or lack of alignment with inspecting perspectives, and those are things that will continue. But again, I think we're making good progress. Of course you would have had to been asleep I guess and not pick up on the fact that the president issued an executive order on cyber. That executive order provides for the establishment of a cyber framework. We haven't seen that framework. It also will provide for us and compare ourselves against that

- 1 framework. We think that given the work that the industry's already done in
- 2 response to the rulemaking talked about and the plans and their implementation,
- 3 I think we'll be -- we think we're in a very good position moving forward with
- 4 respect to cyber.
- 5 TONY PIETRANGELO: I'm where Michael's at on this. 2012 was
- 6 a busy year for cyber in terms of getting through the milestones. There's been
- 7 some interpretational issues with the inspection. Just got to keep the dialogue
- 8 going on this and work through this.
- 9 Cyber threat is real. This is not Y2K all over again, so we take it
- 10 seriously. We know there's bad guys out there doing stuff. I mean we see it in
- 11 the news every day. So we have to take it seriously. I think, you know, we're --
- we got through it last year. We're into implementation and inspection now. Just
- have to make sure the communication's good on this and we're all aligned on the
- 14 right things.
- 15 ERIC LEEDS: Thank you. Thank you. Go to a very -- I think this is
- 16 a very interesting question. Not that they haven't all been very interesting but --
- 17 [laughter]
- 18 -- I don't usually get questions like this, or see questions like this.
- 19 And I think that this is directly related to what the -- we saw the accident over at
- 20 Fukushima. The question's to all the panelists. I would like to hear each
- 21 speaker's perspective on how to interpret NRC's mission on protection of the
- 22 environment, specifically with regard to land contamination. So the issue has to
- 23 do with land contamination, and it's directed at the NRC, but of course, licensees
- 24 have quite a role to play with what they do every day at their plants to ensure that

we don't have inadvertent releases and that releases are monitored and measured and reported.

So if you'd like, Dennis, I'll ask you to take the --

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DENNIS KOEHL: Yeah, I'll start with that. From the standpoint of emergency procedures, right into our severe accident mitigating guidelines, into how we train and how we actually go about our day-to-day business, I believe we keep and really do try to protect that one item and take it very seriously, the health and safety of the public, and that includes land contamination. We do rigorously review our procedures and processes. We had guite a bit of dialogue when the issue came up on filtered vents from the standpoint of how we looked at all the different filtering strategies that we've incorporated here in the United States. The making use of our water inventory in scrubbing the contaminants out before we would actually make releases. When we make releases, why we would do that. So I think from the industry standpoint we do take it very seriously and we look for the different opportunities and we look for the new better technology that may be able to be deployed. That not always being a specific component but a reevaluation of our severe accident mitigating guidelines and how we as a team, and I do mean it's a team at the site, actually works their way through a severe accident. And works to minimize what would be released to the environment.

ERIC LEEDS: Thank you, Dennis.

TONY PIETRANGELO: I'll go back to ground water protection, of what we do for tritium. We weren't required to do what we're doing. We took an industry initiative to do this. And it wasn't cheap, and it's ongoing. So we take land contamination very seriously from the minute that really doesn't have any

- 1 safety significance. But I think everyone concluded was undermining public
- 2 confidence in what we do on a day-to-day basis. I think there's not a good
- 3 understanding of all the different measures we take per the existing requirements
- 4 on sampling around the site, et cetera, to assure that we're protecting the
- 5 environment.

In an accident situation we've always said that prevention's the best medicine for that, and a large portion of our actions are slated for prevention. But we're also seeing areas where we can significantly enhance our capabilities with severe accident management by what we're doing with the new equipment on prevention. So I think that's kind of the next area we see going forward. I -- we await the Commission's decision obviously on the filter issue, but I expect we'll -- our dialogue is only just beginning on this.

MICHAEL JOHNSON: Yeah, actually I don't know that I have much to add beyond what Dennis and Tony had mentioned. And Commissioner Ostendorff's comments, I think, and in terms of taking up the economic consequences issue that we raised, that the Commission's deciding on, the Commission will weigh in with respect to how they want us to move forward with respect to that issue. We do focus, of course, on protection of public health and safety. We do, in terms of protecting the environment, protect people. And we are mindful enough of regulatory processes about the effects of land contamination we consider in our regulatory analysis, and sort of repeating all of the points that we raise for the Commission on the economic consequences product that we sent to them. The Commission will ultimately have to decide whether they want us to in a more formal way consider land contamination, if you

1	will, and then I'	ve got a de	cision in fron	t of them with re	espect to field even	ts. So
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2 we'll wait to see, I think, where they come out with respect to those issues.

ERIC LEEDS: All right, thank you. You all have been sitting through very, very well. I really want to thank you all for the wonderful questions. I'm going to give our panel one last question, and I'll remind them that they stand between you and lunch.

## 7 [laughter]

The last question has to do with public education and outreach, and if -- I'll leave this question as open as possible. Let the panelists take it wherever they'd like. But with regard to public education and outreach for -- with regard to nuclear matters, if they had their way, what types of issues, what types of outreaches would you all practice or recommend going forward with regard to public education on nuclear matters?

DENNIS KOEHL: Well I'll start if you want. You know, shortly after 9/11 for utilities that had information centers or visitor centers where you can come in we actually closed down. If you can remember back in the days we used to do a lot from the standpoint of doing tours at nuclear facilities. I think we are going past the original reaction to 9/11, and we've now gone back to being more open and also working and reaching out with the communities to educate them.

My belief is the more that we can educate the community as well as the individuals around the plants or even other individuals that may live even further away, the better off we are. Because I think sometimes it's the fear of the unknown that really gets the community to have questions or bring questions. So I think the more that we can be open, bring them in, let them see everything

1 that's going on definitely from the standpoint of the security of the facility --

2 anybody that's gone and done a tour of a nuclear plant today will find that it's a

lot different than it was 20 years ago, and walking in from the standpoint of how

secure it is and those measures. And I think from the defense in depth, it also

gives us the opportunity to educate the community on the amount of defense in

6 depth that we have. So every bit of our business, whether it be on the electrical

side, whether it be on the water side, we have quite a bit of defense in depth, and

8 educating them does help reduce that anxiety.

TONY PIETRANGELO: Dennis is exactly right. Marv likes to say we always win when we get people to the sites to see it, the physical nature of it, to see the professionalism of the people who work there, the regulators who oversee the sites. That's certainly a huge part of it that, again, we always like to take advantage of.

I'd also point to the industry's response right after Fukushima. We actually did some lessons learned on the BP disaster in the Gulf about what happened there. We didn't run and hide the first weekend. We were out there. We had to explain what was happening and what we were doing with respect to our plants. And I think that transparency has helped us recover some -- most of the public confidence we had prior to Fukushima. I think we were 71 percent favorable in February of 2011. That dipped down to 46 percent in April of 2011. And now I think we're back up to 68 percent. So we try to be very open and transparent about the actions we're taking. We appreciate the agency doing that as well because we're in this together, right? Our confidence in nuclear energy is directly tied to the confidence in the regulator, so we need a strong, credible

1	regulator. The more we get out there and explain what we're doing and why, the				
2	better off we'll be.				
3	MICHAEL JOHNSON: I think all of the points are good points. And				
4	I would I love the question actually. And in fact, one of the things I'm going to				
5	do is there's a regional administrator panel after lunch. I'm going to take that				
6	question to them, and that'll be a question I ask the regional administrators to				
7	respond to and our other industry panelists to respond to after lunch. I think it is				
8	such an important question. We've had a number of discussions internally abou				
9	that very issue. So I just shut up and let you do lunch and let you hear from				
10	them afterwards.				
11	ERIC LEEDS: Okay, please join me in thanking the panelists for				
12	the session. Hope you enjoyed it.				
13	[applause]				

[Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded]